STUDENT ESSAY

AD-A140 872

DTIC FILE COPY

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PLANNING IMPERATIVES
APPLICABLE TO HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD F. BRAUER JR.
USAF

DTIC
ELECTE
MAY 8 1984
A

16 APRIL 1984

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

84 05 0

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A140872	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) A Critical Examination of Planning Imperatives Applicable to Hostage Rescue Operations		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Student Essay
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Brauer, USAF		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 16 April 1984
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 51
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release
distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
This paper will provide the reader a better understanding of specific planning imperatives that must be taken into consideration when planning for military hostage rescue operations. In order to accomplish this, the paper will critically examine four major rescue missions that were attempted or completed between the period November 1970 and April 1980. Operations discussed, in chronological order, include the Son Tay raid (November 1970), the Mayaguez crisis, (May 1975), the Entebbe raid (July 1976), and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt (April 1980). A brief overview of the specifics of each of the four

DD FORM 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
1 JAN 73

operations will be provided followed by a discussion of hostage rescue
operations in general. Based on the historical lessons of success and failure
gleaned from the above operations, the paper will identify specific planning
imperatives that appear to be common to all such missions. Since the frequency
of terrorist and hostage taking incidents appears to be on the increase, the
ultimate intent of this paper is to provide future military contingency
planners a broad but comprehensive analysis of these imperatives to aid them in
their planning task.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This
document may not be released for open publication until
it has been cleared by the appropriate military service
or government agency.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PLANNING IMPERATIVES
APPLICABLE TO HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Brauer Jr.
USAF

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
16 April 1984

DTIC
ELECTE
S MAY 8 1984 D

A

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Richard F. Brauer Jr., LTC, USAF

TITLE: A Critical Examination of Planning Imperatives Applicable
To Hostage Rescue Operations

FORMAT: Individual Essay

DATE: 16 April 1984 PAGES: 51 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper will provide the reader a better understanding of spe-
cific planning imperatives that must be taken into consideration when
planning for military hostage rescue operations. In order to accomplish
this, the paper will critically examine four major rescue missions that
were attempted or completed between the period November 1970 and April
1980. Operations discussed, in chronological order, include the Son Tay
raid (November 1970), the Mayaguez crisis, (May 1975), the Entebbe raid
(July 1976), and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt (April 1980). A
brief overview of the specifics of each of the four operations will be
provided followed by a discussion of hostage rescue operations in general.
Based on the historical lessons of success and failure gleaned from the
above operations, the paper will identify specific planning imperatives
that appear to be common to all such missions. Since the frequency of
terrorist and hostage taking incidents appears to be on the increase,
the ultimate intent of this paper is to provide future military contin-
gency planners a broad but comprehensive analysis of these imperatives
to aid them in their planning task.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Hostage rescue operations are like icebergs. Occasionally, after a brief but brilliant success or a dismal failure, we are allowed a momentary glimpse of only the very tip of the berg. Most often, due to operational security and sensitivity requirements, we seldom immediately see the nine tenths of the operation that has purposely remained hidden beneath the waves. However, in today's world of mass media, with its rapid proliferation of the spoken and written word, it is only a matter of time before we are exposed to the details of an attempted or completed hostage rescue mission is its entirety. No sooner had the word of the aborted US rescue attempt in Iran on 25 April 1980 hit the news media, when dozens of columnists, journalists, editors, congressional committees, defense analysts, political candidates and armchair strategists began to expound a surfeit of commentary as to the inadequacy of the planning effort, the mistakes in execution and their own personal theories as to the reasons for failure. Though some of the more perceptive of these individuals have hit upon several valid criticisms of the operation, it is this author's contention that most can never fully appreciate the enormity of the task at hand until they have personally participated in the actual planning for such an operation under the omnipresent constraints that inevitably surround that effort.

The purpose of this paper is to give the reader a better appreciation of hostage rescue operations in general, particularly with regard to the planning imperatives behind them. To do this, we will critically examine four attempted or completed hostage rescue operations: Son Tay

1

(November 1970), Mayaguez (May 1975), Entebbe (July 1976), and Iran
(April 1980). The emphasis will not be placed on what transpired during
the operations themselves, for this is a matter of historical record,
but on the thought processes and preparation that went into these mis-
sions, searching for commonalities, differences and lessons learned that
can be applied to future planning operations. Sources used for this
paper were wholly unclassified and consisted of at least one major book
on each rescue operation and some 68 articles/reports on the subject
from periodicals and professional journals.

OVERVIEW OF FOUR SELECTED OPERATIONS

The first of the operations chronologically, was the raid (code name
"Kingpin") on the Son Tay prison compound approximately 23 miles from
Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam, on 21 November 1970. The mission of
the 56-man heliborne assault force was to rescue 61 US prisoners of war
(PWs) believed to have been held captive there. Planning for the raid
had begun six months earlier. During that period the rescue force
secretly rehearsed the primary and several backup assault plans. On the
evening of 20 November, the rescue force, including 105 aircraft from
five air bases in Thailand and three aircraft carriers in the Gulf of
Tonkin (for diversionary airstrikes), launched so as to converge on their
respective targets in what was to become the most extensive night opera-
tion of the Southeast Asia conflict.[1] After a grueling 340 mile, air-
refueled flight, the assault force successfully landed in the Son Tay
compound at 2:18 AM (local time) on 21 November to find the prison camp
empty. Despite a firefight with what appeared to be about 200 Chinese
or Russian troops as a result of a helicopter inadvertantly landing in a
wrong location, total friendly casualties for the entire operation

2

consisted of only one man slightly wounded and a broken ankle. Estimates of enemy dead vary between 100 and 200 KIA. After only 27 minutes on the ground at Son Tay the force successfully withdrew to their launch/ recovery bases in Thailand. Though the tactical plans were meticulously executed, the mission was considered a failure, primarily due to a major intelligence oversight. It was later revealed that the POWs held at Son Tay had been removed from the camp by the North Vietnamese some four and a half months earlier because of persistent flooding in the area. The terrible irony was that the flooding had most likely been caused by Operation "Popeye," a covert US weather modification/cloud seeding experimental program in the region.[2] For some Americans the Son Tay raid became yet another manifestation of the US failure in Vietnam. For others, the mission became a symbol of hope for eventual recovery of all our POWs and some listed as MIA. In any case, a major positive effect of the mission was that the North Vietnamese were forced to consolidate our POWs, thus "liberating" many prisoners from an existence of years of isolation and near isolation.

The Mayaguez incident occurred during the period 12-15 May 1975. Unlike the Son Tay rescue operation, which had been carefully planned and executed by special operations forces in the utmost secrecy, the recovery of the US merchant ship, SS Mayaguez, was conducted in an open, ad hoc, crisis response environment by conventional military forces. The Mayaguez, an obscure vessel of US registry (and the first fully containerized ship in the merchant fleet) had been enroute from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand with a containerized cargo of commercial items including food, clothing, medical supplies and mail. On the afternoon of 12 May 1975, in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island, approximately 60

3

miles southwest of the Cambodian port of Kompong Som, Cambodian revolutionary government naval forces fired upon and boarded the Mayaguez, seized the vessel and her 40-man crew and began to proceed to the Cambodian mainland. During the next three and one-half days, the US mounted a major, joint military assault and recovery operation involving Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force personnel and assets against Cambodian communist forces on Koh Tang Island, another offshore island 30 miles to the north of Poulo Wai, where the Mayaguez lay anchored and her crew was believed to be held prisoner. Additional retaliatory airstrikes were conducted against the Cambodian mainland at Ream airfield. On 15 May the Mayaguez was recovered intact and her crew returned by the Cambodians to US custody, but not without cost. Another intelligence failure had grossly underestimated the Cambodian military forces and weapons on Koh Tang Island and US casualties were high with 18 killed in the assault and 50 wounded. Eight helicopters were lost in action on or near the island and one crashed in Thailand enroute to the crisis area which accounted for an additional 23 dead. Prompt and decisive action on the part of the Ford Administration had resulted in the successful recovery of the ship and her crew and a concomitant boost in US self-image. The incident did, however, refocus Congressional attention on the 1973 War Powers Resolution which affects the President's ability to commit US military forces in crisis situations.

The Entebbe operation of 4 July 1976 was originally code named "Thunderbolt" and later renamed "Operation Jonathan" after Lieutenant Colonel Yonni (Jonathan) Netanyahu, the commander of the Israeli assault force who was killed in action during the rescue mission[3] The gesture of renaming the operation reflected an overwhelming national sentiment of gratitude on the part of the Israeli people. The Entebbe rescue was

similar to both the Son Tay and Mayaguez operations in that like Son Tay, the operation was conducted with Operations Security (OPSEC) and the need for absolute secrecy as driving factors, and, as with the Mayaguez crisis, _time_ was of the essence. The crisis began on 27 June 1976, when Air France Flight 139, enroute from Tel Aviv via Athens to Paris, was skyjacked by ten Palestinian terrorists (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and taken, via a refueling stop in Libya, to Entebbe airport in Uganda. Facts surrounding the skyjack operation would indicate a high degree of complicity on the part of Ugandan President Idi Amin. In exchange for the passengers the skyjackers demanded release of other terrorists being held in Israel, France, Switzerland, Kenya and West Germany. Threats to kill the passengers and blow up the aircraft were made and deadlines for demands were established. Some non-Israeli hostages were released eventually, but 93 remained and an additional 12 airline crew members. Shortly after the aircraft had been hijacked, Israeli commando forces were secretly placed on alert, preliminary plans for a rescue attempt were drawn up and training exercises and rehearsals were conducted. After receiving a second terrorist ultimatum, the rescue force, consisting of four C-130 transport aircraft loaded with assault teams, was launched on 3 July 1976 from Tel Aviv and quietly landed at Entebbe airport shortly after midnight on 4 July. Within minutes, seven of the terrorists had been eliminated and it is believed three were taken prisoner for later interrogation. Only 53 minutes after initial touchdown of the rescue force, the surviving 102 hostages were enroute to Israel via a refueling stop in Nairobi. Total ground time for the entire operation was 90 minutes. Casualties included three civilian hostages, five civilians wounded, one officer killed and four

5

soldiers wounded (one seriously). The raid was deemed an unquestionable success in the eyes of Israel and the rest of the world and became a model to be emulated in part, by the planners of the Iranian rescue attempt.

The Iranian hostage crisis began on 4 November 1979 with the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran by Iranian militants. It marked the beginning of an extremely difficult period for both the Carter Administration and the American people. During the 444 days following the seizure until the 53 hostages were released, President Carter listened to a myriad of proposals for freeing them, to include the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. At Presidential direction, preliminary planning for a rescue operation began only two days after the embassy was taken.[4] Operation "Eagle Claw" became the name of the operation to free the hostages with "Rice Bowl" the code name for the planning phase of that mission.[5] The final plan was, of necessity, extremely complex and demanding. Time, distances involved and the location of the hostages became major obstacles. Essentially, three US Air Force troop-carrying MC-130 Combat Talons (special operations configured C-130s) and three ground-refueling configured EC-130s would depart from the island of Masirah off the coast of Oman and fly to a site in Iran's Dasht-e-Kavir desert, called "Desert One," some 200 miles southeast of Teheran. Here, they would await the arrival of eight Navy RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters (flown by Marine pilots) which had launched from the carrier Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman and flown the 600 miles to the rendezvous site. On arrival, the helicopters would refuel from the C-130s and onload a specially trained US Army assault team of 90 men. Early in the planning for the rescue operation it was identified that an absolute minimum of six flyable helicopters would be required at this point to

6

lift the assault force and their equipment to the next location. If this criterion was not met, the mission would have to be aborted at Desert One. (The number of helicopters selected for the operation was to become a key issue for debate long after the rescue attem. had failed.) Once the helicopters had refueled and onloaded the assault force, the C-130s would return to Masirah and the helicopters would proceed to several hide sites—one for the assault team and one for the helicopters in the vicinity of Garmsar. Virtually all operations were to take place under cover of darkness. The assault team would eventually be met by DOD agents who had been placed in Teheran several days before and after a series of covert linkups, would be provided a number of Mercedes trucks that had been stored in a warehouse on the outskirts of Teheran. The team would be divided into three elements and use the trucks to position themselves for an assault on the Embassy compound. Once the tactical assault plan had been executed and the hostages freed, the helicopters orbiting north of Teheran would land in the vicinity of the compound (or in nearby Amjadieh soccer stadium, if the compound was blocked) and extract the hostages and assault team to Manzariyeh airfield, thirty-five miles to the south, which had been seized and secured earlier by US Army Rangers. Once the assault force and hostages had recovered to Manzariyeh, they would transload onto USAF C-141 aircraft and recover to a friendly country.

As the world learned on the morning of 25 April, the mission had been ordered aborted by the President at the Desert One site after equipment failure left the assault force with less than the minimum number of helicopters determined to be required by mission planners to successfully execute the rescue operation. Of the six helicopters that

finally arrived at Desert One, after an extremely difficult flight
through an unforeseen local weather phenomenon known as a "haboob" (dust
cloud of suspended particles), only five were determined to be flyable--
one less than the minimum number required to proceed. Enroute to Desert
One, one helicopter had been forced down due to an indication of impend-
ing rotor blade failure and a second helicopter lost its navigation and
flight instruments and returned to the Nimitz. A third helicopter at
Desert One suffered hydraulic failure and was judged to be unsafe for
further flight. After direct consultation with the on-scene commander
via secure satellite radio communications, the mission was cancelled by
President Carter. As the entire force prepared to withdraw from Desert
One to their launch/recovery bases, one of the RH-53Ds that was changing
position to allow a second helicopter to refuel, collided with a C-130
and both aircraft burst into flames. Eight crewmen (three in the heli-
copter and five in the C-130) died in the conflagration. Because of
the intense heat, exploding ammunition and impending daylight, the
remainder of the force evacuated the Desert One site, leaving behind the
bodies of the eight men in the burning wreckage and the five remaining
operational helicopters. President Carter announced to the American
public at 1:00 AM (Washington time) that an attempt to rescue the hos-
tages had been made but that the mission had ended in failure. Costs of
the failed mission included eight dead and several seriously wounded.
According to Congressional testimony, monetary cost of the attempt was
estimated at around 193 million dollars.[6] An additional cost that
cannot be measured in absolute terms was the diminution of the United
States' reputation for military skill and power. In all fairness to the
brave men who took part in the rescue attempt, just plain bad luck had
as much to do with the failure as any oversight in planning or execution.

8

Rescue missions are somewhat unique from conventional military operations in wartime in that motives behind the individual mission are distinctly and expressly political. The responsibility for ordering the planning and execution of such missions is solely and ultimately the responsibility of the leadership in power. The rescue mission shares the Clausewitzean dictum that it too, is an extension of politics by other means.[7] Unlike conventional military o_ ations, it is expected that the rescue mission be accomplished flawlessly, with all hostages recovered alive, no casualties be incurred by the rescuing force, that the use of violence be solely directed against the captors, and that the existing political situation become no worse than it was prior to the attempt.[8] In other words, hostage rescue missions are unreasonably expected to be perfect. In all cases the preferred solution to any hostage crisis situation is negotiation, since this approach all but negates casualties unless the captors begin selective or indiscriminate execution of their captives. Negotiation buys time, allows one to gather additional intelligence and provides a means for covering rescue preparations prior to an actual assault. It is important to emphasize that negotiation and military preparation and training must be carried out simultaneously, for economy of time reasons and if emergency assault operations are suddenly required.

Closely tied to the notion of the rescue mission as a political act is the fact that it is also an expression of national will. During the Mayaguez crisis it became apparent that the Administration sought to avoid another ignominy such as the 1968 Pueblo incident, where the US reluctance to use force in a swift and decisive manner cost the nation a

great deal of respect and loss of face, particularly in the Far East.
President Ford felt that seizure of a US vessel and crew by a country
(Cambodia) which had so recently caused us embarassment was a very
serious matter. Secretary Kissinger was emphatic on the use of force
and felt that in addition to sending a strong signal to North Korean
President Kim-Il Sung, that the issues at stake went far beyond the
isolated seizure of a US merchant ship on the high seas to questions of
international perceptions of power and US national will.[9] Kissinger
feared that if the Cambodians used the Mayaguez crew the way the North
Koreans manipulated the crew of the Pueblo, those actions could radi-
cally deteriorate the American political posture in the rest of Asia.
The crisis pointed out the need for the US to act promptly to dispel
doubts concerning our national will and capacity to respond to provoca-
tion. For President Ford, the ship had become a symbol: "I felt it
would be far better to take strong action even though the odds might be
against us. It was far better than failing and doing nothing."[10] It is
equally important to realize that the aggressors, whether they be a total-
itarian communist government, leftist militants or a group of terrorists,
have also selected their victims as a symbol of that government or system
which they hope to eventually overthrow or at least, cause political
embarassment to on a global scale. Immediately after the skyjacking
which precipitated the Entebbe rescue mission, Israeli Transport
Minister Gad Yaakobi was quick to point out to the task force formed to
deal with the situation, that the terrorists' target was indeed, the
nation of Israel.[11] The decision to go ahead with the Iranian hostage
rescue attempt was clearly tied to national will. Critics of that
decision voiced opposing sentiments stating that President Carter let
public opinion drive him toward the military solution. As one critic

10

phrased it, "he decided to ride the tiger."[12] Others, including his

closest advisors, saw the raid as a means to politically demonstrate his

courage to act decisively as the Chief Executive, while bolstering world

opinion of American power.[13] On 11 April 1980 at a meeting of the

National Security Council (NSC), the President made his final decision

to proceed with the military option. As his National Security Advisor,

Zbigniew Brzezinski so aptly phrased it, he decided to "lance the boil

of American frustration."[14]

In the case of the Son Tay and Iranian rescue missions, sufficient

time was available to adequately plan the mission, choosing time and

place of execution. During both the Mayaguez and Entebbe operations,

time was a particularly critical factor if lives were to be saved and

national prestige restored. Both these latter crises highlighted the

need for in-being, workable crisis-response mechanisms within each of

the respective governments. The Joint Staff Officers' Guide defines a

crisis as:

> an incident external to the continental United
> States that develops rapidly and creates a condition
> of such diplomatic, political, or military importance
> to the US government that commitment of US military
> forces is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

Resolution of crises are therefore vital to US national objectives and

national strategy and are usually time constrained. In the case of the

skyjacking leading to Entebbe, a carefully tailored crisis management

team was quickly formed two hours after the first intelligence reports

of the incident arrived. Each member of the crisis task force was

supported by teams of specialists from various military, political and

diplomatic organizations. During the Mayaguez incident, only four hours

after President Ford was notified of the seizure, the first of many NSC

11

meetings was convened to discuss an appropriate response to the situation.[15] Notification of the incident was made by the watch team on duty in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon, which is operated by J-3, JCS and responsible for the "situation monitoring" phase of the six-phase Crisis Action System (CAS) as specified in Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Volume IV. This system provides that existing mechanism called for to deal with crisis situations that may require the use of quickly tailored conventional forces or specially trained units which have been formed to cope specifically with hostage situations. (Details concerning such units have been omitted in this paper for classification and strict need-to-know reasons.)

At this point let us briefly discuss the type of forces that are appropriate for conduct of most hostage rescue operations. It is this author's contention that special operations units are best suited for these purposes, not because of any false elitist pride, but because the individuals within these units, through natural inclination, operational experience or training, have developed a particular mind-set that is essential for survival. Special operations, since their origins in the days of the OSS, have been small in size, covert or clandestine by nature and imaginative due to necessity or design. During such operations the chances of success are small, the uncertainties are great and the odds for getting killed even greater. As one author put it, the use of such forces might be compared to the "quiet use of a surgical knife" as opposed to using a "big stick."[16] The Israelis have historically assigned such missions to their commando units. US special operations forces include US Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Navy SEALS and US Air Force special operations units. Unfortunately, throughout the

12

history of these units and their predecessor organizations, each of the services have displayed an obvious inherent distrust of these non-standard, so called "elitist" units and responded, as would be expected, with low personnel promotion rates and benign neglect in the fiscal support arena. Some progress has been made in this latter area with the rising national interest in our ability to respond to global trans-national terrorism. Training and equipment are important to special operations personnel but imagination and ingenuity are paramount. Colonel Charlie Beckwith, leader of the assault force on the Iranian rescue attempt described special operations as a "rare and exotic bird."[17] The ability to improvise and use standard equipment in non-standard ways becomes critically important when funds are lacking, time is short and OPSEC dictates that routine supply channels be avoided at all costs. The Son Tay raiders were particularly adept at using Sears Roebuck catalogues to obtain ideas and rough specifications for a host of mission-peculiar items that would be needed on the raid.[18] Israeli Major General (retired) Shlomo Gazit served as Director of Military Intelligence from 1974 to 1979 and was a participant in the planning for the Entebbe raid. He very adequately portrayed the special operations mind-set when he stated that the planner for a rescue operation requires "the mentality and expertise of a bank robber."[19] Further requirements for both planners and operations in this field include attention to detail, an extreme awareness of the need for precise timing in the conduct of operations and a willingness to accept unusual orders and missions without question. The motto of the US Air Force 1st Special Operations Wing says it yet another way: "Anytime, Anyplace."

Prior to attempting a rescue mission, serious consideration must be given to defining success, assessing risk and determining political, operational and technical feasibility. Definitions of success vary from mission completion with no friendly casualties to partial rescue with an "acceptable" number of losses, whatever that figure may be. A factor taken into consideration by the Son Tay planners when attempting to define success was what retaliatory measures the North Vietnamese would take against those prisoners left behind in other POW camps. It was generally accepted that the North Vietnamese would not make reprisals against those POWs who had nothing to do with and were probably unaware of the raid. The Israelis decided that the Entebbe rescue must be attempted at all costs even though odds for success were assessed as being small due to the great distances involved and the lack of information concerning the terrorists. The deciding factor for the Israeli government was when the terrorists began a "selection" process among the hostages, separating Jew from non-Jew that portended ominous bodings reminiscent of Dachau and Buchenwald. Success during the Mayaguez crisis, for political reasons previously discussed, was determined to be rapid recovery of the ship and her 40-man crew. This was achieved at a cost of 41 US Dead, 50 wounded and millions of dollars of military equipment. Some would say the true measure of success was in achieving a restoration of US stature as a highly capable military power in the eyes of the world. Mission success can be defined in many ways. As a result of the "failed" Son Tay raid, all US POWs were relocated to Hanoi. Many who had been incommunicado and isolated for years were now confined with other prisoners, thereby providing support for one another by communicating and organizing. POW morale soared and the general feeling was that the raid clearly demonstrated the US had not forgotten their

14

plight. Most importantly, the raid was a blow to the North Vietnamese psyche, leaving them with a feeling of vulnerability. As Colonel "Bull" Simons, assault leader on the raid stated, "Christ, the thing was worth doing without getting them."[20]

In addition to defining success and assessing political risks, when contemplating rescue missions, the utmost scrutiny must be given to assessing operational and technical feasibility of the plan. For lack of one flyable helicopter at Desert One, the course of history was changed. Speculation abounds as to whether the plan would have been successful or resulted in disaster and the world will never know. Planners for the Iran mission assigned a 96.5% probability factor that six of the eight helicopters would arrive at their hide site in a flyable condition. An increase of two more helicopters would have boosted that probability to 99.2%, however this would have also required the addition of yet another fuel carrying C-130 and thereby increased both chances of detection and maintenance failures. The decision was made to accept the additional 2.7% risk factor and keep the number at eight helicopters.[21] Many critics have argued, after the fact, that a failure to conduct a serious operational analysis considering all the various phases of the rescue plan predetermined the failure of the entire operation. According to Dr. Stefan T. Possony, Associate Editor of Defense and Foreign Affairs, using eight helicopters in the five distinct phases of the Eagle Claw operation yields a probability of overall success of only 0.3, while increasing the number of helicopters to 18 increases that probability to 0.9.[22] Political considerations can impact heavily on the technical aspects of the plan. President Carter felt that the number of helicopters (eight) deemed necessary by the JCS

15

was acceptable since he wished to present this mission to the world as one with humanitarian overtones and not an act of war against Iran. The point to be made here is that during the planning process a balance must be achieved between hard requirements dictated by operational analysis and those dictated by availability of equipment, additional risk factors incurred and political considerations. As alluded to earlier, special operations rescue missions have historically had low probabilities of success. At one point during the initial planning for the Iran attempt, the Chairman of the JCS, General David Jones, queried Colonel Beckwith as to the probability of success and the risks. Colonel Beckwith replied, "Sir, the probability of success is zero and the risks are high."[23] Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, was totally convinced the plan would not work and that any attempt to conduct a rescue would result in considerable harm to both the rescue force and ultimately, the hostages. He stressed the need for continued negotiation in State Department channels and expressed concern about an adverse Soviet response to the raid. Although he was aware of the planning for the attempt prior to execution, he resigned his post in protest following its failure.

The resignation cited above was yet another political "price" that had to be paid by the Carter Administration. The Iranians were quick to exploit the equipment, sensitive documents and (sadly) the human remains left behind, for propaganda purposes. The technical failure on Desert One dealt a heavy blow to the psychological well-being of the United States and sounded the political death knell for the Carter Administration. Political responsibility for the failed mission was borne solely by the President. The lesson learned is that when planning for success one must also be prepared for failure. Rescue missions are inherently high risk ventures

16

and planners must analyze the implications of failure both at the tacti-
cal and strategic level and be prepared to accept the consequences of
failure. This is particularly true for special operations missions
while have critical visibility to the world and which, often despite
their small size, can shape perceptions of the United States as a world
power.

Historically such missions have failed much more than they have
succeeded. This is not to say, however, that the reasons behind them
were not cogent enough to warrant their attempt. An average of at least
three out of four commando, British intelligence and OSS operations
during World War II in the European theater were considered failures and
French special operations in Indochina and Algeria did not seem to fare
any better. The Son Tay raid was, by no means, the first such POW
rescue attempt in Southeast Asia, but actually the 71st "dry hole!"
Between 1966 and 1970, 91 such POW rescue attempts were conducted in
South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos based on intelligence reports. Of the
91 attempts, 20 were successful, recovering 318 South Vietnamese and 60
civilians. Forty-five of those raids were mounted for the purpose of
rescuing American POWs, however, only one was successful, recovering one
US Army Specialist Fourth Class who died 15 hours after his liberation,
of wounds inflicted by his captors prior to arrival of the rescuing
force.[24]

The use of history as precedent is seen repeatedly in the planning
for the conduct of rescue missions. The chief value in studying history
is that those who study it may learn lessons for the future. In 1968
the USS Pueblo was captured by the North Koreans and 82 American sailors
were incarcerated for 10 months. The lesson was painfully learned that

17

any possibility of rescuing the ship and crew had been reduced to zero once the ship reached the harbor in North Korea. When the Mayaguez crisis unfolded in May 1975, President Ford lost no time in committing military forces to prevent the ship from being taken to a Cambodian port. The Pueblo "lesson" had not been wasted on the Administration. Negotiation is one avenue of release that must be pursued simultaneously with tactical mission planning; however, in maritime crisis situations such as those cited above, history has taught us that the best time to resolve the crisis militarily, is immediately after it occurs. Planners for the Entebbe operation carefully studied lessons learned during Son Tay and were continually plagued by doubt and "planner's remorse" that they would strike and find the airport void of hostages as the Americans had experienced some six years earlier.[25] After having successfully executed one of the most successful commando raids in history, Israel was quick to offer the benefit of lessons learned to the Carter Administration only 18 hours after the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran in the form of a rescue plan modelled on their earlier success. The President initially opted to pursue negotiation instead and shortly thereafter set the wheels in motion to initiate a US planning effort.[26]

Once the political decision has been reached to proceed with planning a rescue mission, the first step should be to examine the characteristics and capabilities of both the captor and the captive. In both the Son Tay and Mayaguez operations the captors were conventional military personnel (guards and soldiers) and for Iran, were militant students; however, for discussion and brevity's sake let us refer to the captor as the "terrorist" and the captive as the "hostage" from this point on. Knowing not only the size but the type of terrorist group you are facing is important in that the larger, transnational groups have

18

well-known, historically documented modus operandi. Transnational
terrorist groups are state sponsored and have political objectives that
clearly transcend national boundries.[27] Group composition is equally
important to ascertain. Are there any women or varied nationalities
within the group? The ten PLFP terrorists that seized Air France Flight
139 (Entebbe crisis) were led by a German couple of remarkably different
personality types. Other important Essential Elements of Information
(EEI) that should be actively sought are the number and kinds of wec;ons,
explosives or boobytraps they possess, the probability they will carry
out any threats and the types of demands they are likely to make.
Terrorists today are becoming increasingly sophisticated and high tech-
nology can provide them enhanced capabilities in communications and
counter-surveillance techniques as well. Besides current disposition of
the group, perhaps the most important and difficult to ascertain infor-
mation is that regarding the terrorists' states of mind and actual
intentions. (An odd axiom of terrorism is that historically, if hos-
tages are not killed in the first few days after their capture, they
probably never will be and eventually become a burden to their captors.)
During the Entebbe crisis, non-Israeli passengers that had been released
prior to the assault were able to provide planners with much of this
essential information. Rescue planners should actively seek inside
sources of information whenever possible. This type of intelligence is
usually the most difficult to obtain and at the same time the most
critical to the final assault phase of the operation. In studying the
objective, equal consideration must be given to number and composition
of the hostage group as well. The presence of women, children, clergy-
men or important personages may dictate the type and level of violence

19

to be used by the assault force. The ethnic composition of the hostage group must also be taken into account, since the rescuing force will probably only issue commands upon ingress in one language, such as "Lie down!" or "Remain still!" During the Entebbe raid each squad had a soldier with a loudspeaker who shouted commands to the hostages to lie down. Those that remained standing stood a chance of being deliberately shot or caught in a crossfire. Hostage behavior can be expected to be quite unpredictable, especially after long months of incarceration. Positive relationships may develop over time between the captive and the captor, often referred to as the "Stockholm Syndrome," after a Swedish bank robbery incident in 1973 where the hostages began to identify with the bank robbers and became sympathetic to their plight. During the Entebbe crisis, the male German terrorist leader, very much unlike the female, adopted a pleasant manner and was considered quiet and even affable by many of the hostages. Others were not so easily deceived.[28] Planners must be aware that basic human needs compel the hostage to see the human qualities in his tormentor and adjust their assault plans accordingly. A good rule of thumb with regard to hostage behavior during the assault phase is to "expect the unexpected." Some may freeze, faint or scream and others will run. The most difficult to deal with and dangerous to himself is the hostage who heroically tries to assist the rescuers by seizing a terrorist weapon, and therefore puts himself in peril. A visible symbol, such as an American flag on the assault uniform or a spoken familiar word or phrase (the Israeli commandos shouted "Israel") will do much to instantly bring the hostage to abrupt realization of the rescue that is taking place around him. During planning for the Iranian rescue, Colonel Beckwith requested permission

from President Carter to use the phrase, "The President of the United States has sent us."[29]

PLANNING IMPERATIVES

It is this author's contention that any planning element for a hostage rescue operation must take into consideration three basic principles, two of which are classic Principles of War. They are: _speed, simplicity_ and _surprise_. Speed in responding to a crisis situation is predicated on recognition that a crisis exists. During the Mayaguez incident, the elapsed time from receipt of the initial report of the seizure of the ship in the NMCC until launch of a Navy reconnaissance aircraft for on-scene surveillance was on the order of only two hours and twenty minutes.[30] Speed in planning and execution is paramount since windows of time, meteorological or climatological considerations may restrict a planned operation to certain periods. Speed in execution is important since terrorists are vulnerable during the initial hours of a hostage situation, for they have often not had time to sufficiently organize shift schedules and surveillance plans. Regarding "windows," the Son Tay planners were conscious of the need to execute the raid prior to the arrival of the monsoon season. Planners for the Teheran raid were aware that any delay in execution would exclude a helicopter option due to impending high summer temperatures in the Iranian desert and resultant loss of aerodynamic lift.

Simplicity in a plan is highly desirable but very often difficult to achieve. There is a measure of elegance in simplicity. The simpler the plan the fewer things can go wrong. (In philosophy, Occam's Razor states that in choosing between two similar hypotheses, the simpler is preferred.) During the Mayaguez affair, no less than five different options were

21

presented by General Jones, then acting Chairman of the JCS. Planning for the Iran rescue attempt yielded a considerably greater number due to the difficulties involved. The tendency is usually to provide too many options. In addition to seeking simplicity with regard to both numbers and complexity of courses of action, forces should be kept as small as the situation will allow. Larger forces mean greater logistics requirements and more chance for mission compromise. There is an Israeli Defense Force adage that says, "Lean forces fight best."[31] It is also axiomatic that during any planning for missions of this type, the size of the rescue force will grow, as more difficult planning problems are encountered.

The final basic principle and the single most critical element the planner must attempt to achieve is that of surprise. The Soviets refer to it as "vnezapnost" and consider it one of their basic principles of military art. Stevens and Marsh define surprise as "an event which comes to be known, and perhaps understood, almost exclusively after it has happened."[32] In an assault operation, the element of surprise, used in concert with violence and speed, is the critical element and the sine qua non on which the very lives of the hostages depend. Loss of surprise should nearly always be cause for a decision to abort the mission. Inherent in planning for surprise is the element of deception, which could be defined as the deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain competitive advantage. The Soviet word for deception is "maskirovka" and since the concept is considered as interdependent with surprise (vnezapnost), it is not assigned status as a separate principle of Soviet military art.[33] All but the Mayaguez rescue had deception schemes as part of the basic plan. During the Son Tay raid, firefight

simulators were airdropped by mission aircraft to distract, confuse and demoralize the North Vietnamese. Navy air diversionary missions dropping flares, were flown over Haiphong harbor to divert attention away from the sector of the prison camp and US Air Force F-105 Wild Weasel electronic warfare/defense suppression aircraft were used as "bait" to jam enemy radars and divert Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) defenses away from the ingressing assault force. A valid criticism of the naval air diversion is that for some time prior to the event, the Navy had virtually stopped all airstrikes in the vicinity; the caution here is that an overly elaborate ruse can arouse suspicion and become a liability and counterproductive to the primary mission. A criterion which should serve as a litmus test for a deception scheme is believability, above all else. The planners should lead the enemy to believe what he is predisposed and preconditioned to believe. The Israelis used deception to the maximum during Entebbe. Two of the C-135 (Boeing 707) support aircraft used during the raid were painted with El Al airline colors and made to appear, both inside and out, as commercial aircraft. The occupants wore civilian clothes and carried bogus identification documents. One aircraft was, in fact, a completely equipped airborne command post for the Israeli Air Force commander, and the other a medical evacuation configured aircraft that would stand by to meet the egressing force in Nairobi. The most publicized deception scheme was the black Mercedes Benz sedan, complete with a burly Israeli paratrooper in black makeup, made to look like Idi Amin. The Mercedes preceded the Israeli convoy of Land Rovers as they rolled off the C-130s and rapidly carried the assault force to the old terminal building where the hostages where held. The Israelis determined correctly that the Mercedes was the official car and a symbol of authority in Uganda which would be allowed to pass security

23

points without question. The Ugandan guards fell for the ruse and no
alarm was sounded. Lastly, with regard to the use of deception, prior
to the Iranian rescue attempt, the frequency of C-130 flights in and out
of Egypt was increased as well as the number of night helicopter sorties
from the carrier Nimitz as part of a conditioning mechanism in the
larger deception plan.[34]

Timely and accurate intelligence is the quintessential element that
ultimately determines the difference between success and failure, between
victory and humiliation and between saving lives or losing them. Detailed
intelligence of the last-minute variety is the hallmark requirement of
special operations missions. Every possible source for this type of
information must be actively sought and utilized. Just before launch of
the rescue mission into Teheran, an embassy cook was permitted to leave
the country. By mere chance, a CIA agent discovered the fact and learned
from the cook that the 53 hostages were all together in one location--a
vital and hitherto unknown piece of intelligence which was relayed to
the assault force commander and caused the assault plan to be modified
considerably.[35] Because human beings are predisposed to believe what
they want to believe, very often last-minute intelligence is looked
upon with suspicion, for it will no doubt generate a requirement to
change the plan. Planners and operators will ultimately reach a point
where the tendency is to want to go with the final plan as it was
practiced and rehearsed, for there is comfort in familiarity. Approxi-
mately 24 hours after the execute message had been transmitted to the
deploying Son Tay raiding force (they had not launched on the final
assault phase yet), the mission commander received word that a Vietna-
mese stay-behind agent in North Vietnam, classified by intelligence

sources as "usually reliable," had reported that the camp was empty and the prisoners had been removed. Lingering doubts about the reliability of the agent and conflicting information from overhead infrared imagery caused the commander to execute the raid as planned. Another key lesson learned at Son Tay with regard to the use of aerial photography was that what appears on a photograph is not necessarily the reality of the moment. The plan called for one helicopter to purposely crash land between two small spindly trees shown on SR-71 photography. Because of the length of time between the reconnaissance mission and the raid, the helicopter pilot that was to crash land had to adjust his approach during the final moments to avoid what would have been fatal contact with two huge trees which had grown considerably since last seen by photo interpretation personnel.

The best use of last-minute, reliable intelligence will nearly always remain Human Intelligence (HUMINT) with human eyes on the target. The seizure of the embassy in Teheran in November 1979 left the CIA without a single stay-behind agent in the country until late December when an agent identified as "Bob" was finally reintroduced to provide critical on-scene intelligence. The next best thing to these inside sources or "invisibles" as the Israelis refer to them,[36] are people who have previously had experience in the objective area. Prior to the Entebbe assault, the Israelis interviewed Idi Amin's former personal pilot and the former Israeli attache to Uganda, since both were intimately familiar with the physical layout of the Entebbe airport.

Weather reconnaissance is a form of intelligence that is especially crucial to a plan involving use of air (or maritime) assets. Prior to the Son Tay raid, aerial weather reconnaissance flights were flown along the borders of Laos and North Vietnam because of the increasing threat

of an approaching typhoon and associated cloud systems which could jeopardize the mission. During the Iranian attempt, planners elected not to fly a C-130 weather recce due to the risk of arousing suspicion and possible mission compromise. As it turned out, had a weather ship been flown or had secure radio communications procedures been utilized between the ingressing helicopters and the C-130s ahead of them approaching the clear conditions at Desert One, number five helicopter would probably have continued on through the weakening suspended dust phenomenon (haboob) without instruments, instead of electing to reverse course and return to the Nimitz. In this author's opinion, where aircraft are concerned and the weather is in doubt, the use of weather reconnaissance flights is a planning imperative that is usually worth the risk, especially in areas where enemy Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are known to be weak.

Intelligence failures are often attributed to the fact that worst-case scenarios are often ignored or only partially believed. As a rule of thumb, planners should consider "Murphy" to be an optimist. During the Mayaguez crisis, estimates of enemy strength in Koh Tang varied from 18 Cambodian irregulars with their families to a DIA estimate as high as 200 Khmer Rouge soldiers armed with automatic weapons, mortars and recoilless rifles. As it turned out the DIA estimate proved to be very accurate, however the 175 man Marine assault force was predicated on a considerably smaller and weaker enemy strength estimate of between 20 and 100 lightly armed troops.[37] The decision to use the low estimate resulted in considerable loss of life and equipment.

The final point regarding the processing and evaluation of intelligence is that one central point of collection and collation must be

established within the planning cell where all types of intelligence to include visual imagery from manned and unmanned overhead collection systems, HUMINT and SIGINT can be gathered. This multiplicity of sources will provide planners a means of crosschecking sources in order to determine both verifiability and timeliness of the information.

Operations Security (OPSEC) is the unwritten rubric that must be religiously maintained during the planning, training, deployment, execution and redeployment phases of the mission. OPSEC literally means the difference between getting to the objective undetected and mission compromise. There are as many ways to ensure OPSEC as there are ways to compromise it. During final planning and preparation for Operation Jonathan (Entebbe), anyone associated with the mission, to include high level Cabinet ministers, was cautioned to avoid doing anything out of the ordinary that would arouse suspicion. Personnel travelled about in civilian clothes and used private and commercial rather than military transportation to move to debarkation locations.[38] Perhaps the most difficult aspect with regard to the maintenance of OPSEC is determining to what degree the operation and associated planning will be compartmentalized. Determining who should know, how many should know and what they should know varies with each operation, the political sensitivity of the mission and the guidance from the governing authority. Training of the assault force itself, is a threat to to OPSEC. When an amalgam of various type units is brought together for the first time, it clearly signals that something unusual is in the making. Other indicators of impending military action are cancellation of personnel leaves and passes, interruption or cancellation of unit social and athletic events and prolonged absences of key personnel in the unit command structure. During the planning for Son Tay, OPSEC was considered paramount and the

27

feeling was that the more personnel that knew about the mission, the greater the risk of compromise. As a result, access lists were kept small. Compartmentalization was maintained to the extent that headquarters personnel at the Strategic Air Command (SAC) responsible for SR-71, Buffalo Hunter (drone) and Big Bird (satellite) reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam were not told of what they were trying to photograph. SAC personnel would later state that knowledge of the exact requirement (pinpoint target location rather than area coverage) would have aided considerably in getting the desired photo coverage.[39] With regard to Son Tay, virtually the entire staff directing the war in Southeast Asia was kept in the dark concerning one of the most critical operations ever launched in that theater. The Commander, Pacific Fleet, who was ultimately responsible for the Navy air diversion operation, was never told of the reason for it, though Commander, Carrier Task Force 77 was eventually briefed prior to the raid. Security requirements were so stringent that even the men of the assault force were not told of their mission until airborne and enroute to their final staging location. Three days before the raid, only four key personnel in the ground force knew the target and details of the mission.[40] An effective OPSEC technique used by the Son Tay planners and operators was to routinely disassemble the mockup of the Son Tay camp erected at the training location prior to daylight and especially at those times when the Soviet Cosmos satellite was projected to be overhead. Yet another scheme used during the planning and training effort was to purposely employ US counter-intelligence teams during all phases of the operation to see if they could break the code and determine mission details and objectives Though the counter-intelligence units were only partially successful in

their efforts, quite by accident, a young intelligence officer in the
Evasion and Escape Branch of Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, was
eventually able to determine the mission objective and precise target
location by noticing the upgrading in security classification of requests
for photo reconnaissance over a certain area of North Vietnam. Addi-
tionally, a request for a medical evacuation aircraft configured to
accommodate the exact number of prisoners thought to be held at Son Tay
confirmed his suspicions.

How well OPSEC was truly maintained can only be determined after
mission execution. Planners for the Teheran rescue attempt, like the
Son Tay group, sought to preserve OPSEC above all other considerations.
The commander of the Joint Task Force (JTF) assigned to the mission, was
selected not only because he was an extremely capable officer and already
assigned to the Pentagon, but also because selection of any other high
visibility combat unit commander would arouse undue suspicion and specu-
lation.[41] Only the Carter Administration's top level personnel were
aware of the mission, to include the Vice President (Mondale), Secretary
of Defense (Brown), National Security Advisor (Brzezinski), Director of
the CIA (Turner) and the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan).[42] In the
post mortem following the aborted raid, the JTF effort was critiqued by
the Holloway Commission in a formal report covering 23 separate issues
regarding planning and execution. OPSEC (issue #1) criticisms were that
planning may have been too compartmentalized, thereby inhibiting the
flow of information between players; the lack of a full dress rehearsal
involving all participants, because of perceived security risks was to
result in some operational problems not being identified that would
eventually occur on the mission; and the extreme emphasis on the need
for Communications Security (COMSEC--an essential element of OPSEC)

during mission execution which resulted in a lack of coordination between mission air crews which could have enhanced their capability to handle unforseen emergencies. The Holloway report concluded that "slightly greater selectivity and flexibility in the OPSEC arena, particularly within the JTF, could have been beneficial in operational terms without necessarily sacrificing security."[43] The bottom line regarding OPSEC is that it must be maintained at all costs; however, the degree to which measures are taken to ensure this is strictly a judgement call. A given cost in decreasing OPSEC measures is an increased probability of operational compromise. A lesson learned in the Iranian experience is that OPSEC must not become an obsession. OPSEC requirements and the need for secrecy must be carefully balanced with operational requirements (such as joint training) necessary to accomplish the mission. There is no simple formula or solution for success in this arena. A final word regarding OPSEC is that though we have historically been weak in this area, post-strike OPSEC regarding special operations rescue missions is nearly equally as important as pre-mission OPSEC. Too much light on the mission details can imperil the use of sensitive techniques and equipment in future missions. Both in the Son Tay and Iranian planning, the intent was to never reveal if the missions were unsuccessful, if that was the way they turned out to be. Ideally, for preservation of OPSEC, we should adhere to the principal of silence, but in our open society and given the nature of Congressional inquiry and the American "fourth estate," it is doubtful this could ever be realistically achieved.

The planning process itself for a mission of this type is unique in many ways. Before planning begins, it is important that an agreed upon, limited (for OPSEC purposes) number of personnel from requisite specialties

30

be collocated in a central planning cell, where face-to-face exchanges of views can be facilitated. Once again, the nature and urgency of the crisis will ultimately dictate both the speed of the selection process and the tempo of the planning effort. Expertise in one's field is, of course, a basic requirement for a planner. An additional requirement would be a personality temperment that is capable of coping with a rapidly changing and dynamic crisis situation. Once the planning cell is formed, the planning process must allow for easy exchange of ideas and information as well as clear channels of communication and coordination. Brainstorming and free-wheeling should be encouraged, with no idea considered too implausible until fully evaluated. Hostage rescue operations depend wholly upon the element of surprise to achieve success and the maximum employment of imaginative concepts provides the key to that success. Frequent changes to the basic operational concept are the rule in this type of planning effort. It is important to resist the urge to choose one course of action and stick with it for expediency's sake. The basic plan must be refined or radically changed as necessary until chances of mission success are optimized. One recommended way to insure avoidance of the "groupthink" mentality is to initially establish independent planning teams and isolate them from one another.[44] These teams can then be used to formulate independent plans which can be evaluated later as to operational acceptability, feasibility and suitability. Planning should proceed from the general to the specific. The central planning unit should concentrate on the general concept of the operation while the unit commanders are left unimpeded to pursue the formulation of detailed tactical execution plans. As mentioned earlier, individual unit training, preparation and rehearsal should occur simultaneously with the general planning effort in the interest of time.

31

During crisis situations, immediate, no-plan emergency assault options
should be devised in the event of hostage executions. Early involvement
of political authorities at the highest levels is a necessary element so
that Rules of Engagement (ROE) may be established and politically unaccept-
able ideas may be discarded at the outset of the planning effort. Legal
aspects of the mission, in terms of international law and world opinion
must also be taken into account. Diplomatic negotiation is the preferred
method of obtaining hostage release; however, a dual-track approach,
simultaneously considering a military option is always prudent. In many
cases, as with the Entebbe operation, negotiation can also serve as
deception means in lulling the captors into believing that the diplo-
matic channel is the only recourse open to the "hostage" government.

An important element of the planning process is the mechanism that
has come to be known as the "what-if drill." Once the basic plan is
formulated, an attempt should be made to examine it in the light of
various contingencies, taking into account possible and most probable
technological and human failures. Planners must practice in "thinking
the unthinkable." Although anticipation of every possible contingency
is an admirable goal, experience has shown this can never be truly
achieved. Alexander Scott asserts that the Clausewitzean "fog of war" is
five times as thick for special operations such as hostage rescue mis-
sions and therefore the chances of failure, five times as great.[45] The
what-if drill, as a thought process, should be used continuously by
mission planners during development of the basic plan. Prior to formal
acceptance of a particular plan or course of action, a separate review
group, frequently referred to as a "murder board," should be established
to conduct an independent review of the plan and play the "devil's

32

advocate." The Israelis used an "officer's rap session" for just such a purpose, prior to the raid at Entebbe.[46] The what-if drill should be used to determine the need for alternate and backup plans. The number of these plans, in keeping with the principle of simplicity, should be kept to an absolute minimum. The Son Tay planners developed four backup plans in addition to the primary assault plan. As it turned out, alternate Plan Green was effectively used by the second-in-command when the lead assault helicopter, carrying the tactical mission commander, landed in the wrong location. In cultivating a mind-set that enables the planner to formulate backup plans, it is often helpful to anticipate the worst in every situation. "Murphy" is alive and well in this arena, and if something has not been planned for you can be assured it will "fall through the crack" during mission execution. In airborne rescue operations, especially those involving the use of helicopters, history has taught us that cross-loading of key personnel and equipment to accommodate various backup plans is a planning imperative. Failure to cross-load helicopters is an invitation to disaster. During the Mayaguez crisis; one of the first helicopters shot down at Koh Tang contained every available radio belonging to the Marine command and control and fire support group, thereby greatly hindering subsequent tactical operations.[47] During the Iranian attempt, the number five helicopter that aborted enroute to Desert One and returned to the Nimitz, carried all the spare parts for the remaining mission helicopters.

Destruct plans for sensitive, disabled or purposely abandoned equipment are another sub-task of the what-if planning process. During Son Tay, the assault helicopters were fitted with explosives and detonators. As a safety precaution, electrical initiators were placed apart from the explosives and the electrical leads were left disconnected.

33

When the time came to destroy one helicopter, according to plan, the initiators were connected to the explosives and a built-in timing device provided a time buffer for the egressing rescue party. To further reduce the possibility of technical failure, Colonel Simons ordered that dual fuses be installed in the helicopter to be destroyed. Failure to destroy the five abandoned helicopters at Desert One in Iran, resulted in the loss of the aircraft themselves and the loss of classified documents such as satellite photographs and lists of safe houses, native Iranian sympathizers, and foreign as well as CIA operatives.[48] The recovery of these items by the Iranians resulted in further propaganda efforts to embarass the Carter Administration.

The failure of the Iranian attempt highlights yet another important planning consideration. There must be clearly defined, mandatory abort and go--no go decisions at key points in the tactical plan. When the mishap occurred at Desert One after the decision was made to abort the raid due to an insufficient number of operable helicopters, it was discovered that the force had never anticipated nor practiced aborting the mission at that point and outloading on C-130s for egress operations. Despite anticipation of many contingencies, such as the arrival of a busload of Iranians, it appeared not to have occurred to mission planners that an abort order might be necessitated at so late a point in the operation. Changes to the original plan are not always due to unfavorable events. The need for flexibility can be dictated by fortuitous circumstances as well. During final planning for Entebbe, the plan called for ground refueling of the C-130 aircraft at Entebbe during the tactical operation. At the last minute, a shift in the "political winds" allowed refueling on the return route to Israel at Nairobi,

Kenya, thereby necessitating a last minute, but propitious change of plans.

Flexibility in planning and execution of the mission is achieved in part, by proper selection of the assault force. Special operations missions of this type are, by their nature, _joint_ operations. Planners must insist however, on tailoring the assault force to mission requirements without regard to service composition. Hostage rescue operations are an emotional experience for everyone involved. During the planning for the Iranian mission, some felt that members of the JCS wanted to make sure each of the services had a "piece of the action."[49] As a result, Marine helicopter pilots were used where perhaps Air Force pilots would have been more readily suited for the mission profile. The issue (Number 12 in the Holloway Report) was certainly not which service had the more capable pilots. The facts were that during the training period the Air Force helicopter pilot resources included 114 qualified H-53 pilots, instructors and flight examiners, of whom 96 were current in long range flight and aerial refueling. Most importantly, 86 of these pilots had recent special operations experience.[50] The bottom line was that the Navy possessed the helicopters (RH-53) with the appropriate mission capabilities and the Air Force had on hand, the pilots with the requisite special operations background to fly them, given a brief period of transition training. History has shown that experienced pilots can transition far more easily and quickly to a variant of their aircraft than an inexperienced pilot can train to a new and highly complex mission. This issue is used merely to illustrate the point that service parochialism should be considered anathema to the planning and conduct of hostage rescue missions. An equal share of the glory and credit to each of the four services should never be considered an

35

essential requirement for the rescue operation. In the final analysis, the hostage could care less what uniform or insignia his rescuer wears. Conflict and competition between services (and individual organizations within those services) inhibits effective planning and must be recognized for what it is and held in check.

Logistic support requirements for missions of this type will vary from scenario to scenario; however, they are always unique and demanding not so much in a quantitative sense but because of the types of equipment that may be required. OPSEC requirements dictate that routine supply channels be avoided and exigencies of the mission require issuance of a supply priority code of the highest order. During planning and training for the Son Tay raid, the unit supply section became quickly saturated with requests and supply personnel had difficulty in insuring prompt reaction to sudden equipment requirements. A dedicated, fully manned, centralized supply section armed with requisite blanket authority, preferably in letter format, is highly recommended. Additionally, another highly useful technique is to have on hand sufficient cash funds to allow immediate purchase of hard-to-find or readily accessible items on the local economy.

Medical planning is a particularly important aspect of these type missions. It is a general rule of thumb that casualties and hostages should almost always be loaded on the first helicopter or fixed wing aircraft to leave the objective location. During Entebbe, the Israelis used doctors and medical orderlies trained as combat troops to provide an on-the-scene emergency medical capability. These personnel arrived on the second of the four C-130s to land at Entebbe and were able to treat the five civilian and four military casualties almost immediately in

36

the lowest tactical level. It is important to note, that as undesirable
to a tactical commander as this situation at first might seem, it is
important in a fast-breaking hostage crisis situation that the political
authority be in constant (secure) communication with the assault force
in order to relay latest diplomatic or political developments and intel-
ligence findings, or even intervene and cancel the mission if required.
What is important to emphasize is that the ultimate responsibility for
the success or failure of the mission rests with the highest political
authority and not the military. The principles of centralized command
and control and decentralized execution are equally valid for hostage
rescue operations. The political leader must not attempt to make tacti-
cal decisions for his assault force commander. During the Iranian raid
the decision to abort the rescue attempt was made by President Carter
only after a recommendation to do so was submitted by the senior mili-
tary officer on the ground at Desert One. Similarly, during Entebbe,
tactical decisions were made by the assault force commander. During
both operations, as long as the operation proceeded according to plan,
the national authorities were to remain silent.

During a tactical operation of this nature, the natural human
tendency is for planners to try to increase the number of mandatory
reporting requirements over communications channels so the progress of
the operation may be followed by all concerned. A concerted effort
should be made to keep the number of these reports down to an absolute
minimum. A recommended technique is to develop an "execution checklist"
consisting of numbered events by item number, event description and
code word. Essential, key events which must happen for the plan to
succeed would be designated "mandatory," with all others "non-mandatory"

38

that aircraft which had been configured with operating tables and full hospital equipment.[51] The planners for the raid had also positioned a similarly configured C-135 aircraft at Nairobi, Kenya for emergency treatment of an expected total of 85 casualties. In sum, medical planning must include provision for on-the-spot treatment of wounds resulting from gunshot, explosives and fire, as well as treatment of shock and trauma. A surgical capability is highly recommended, especially where availability of aircraft will permit configuration of an airborne hospital while enroute to permanent medical facilities.

Thorough command, control and communications planning for hostage rescue operations, like the element of surprise, is absolutely critical to mission success. The ability to communicate both laterally within the assault force and horizontally to the command authorities is more than essential. Even during the brief ten year period of the four rescue operations discussed in this paper, the impact of quantum technological advances in communications can be seen. In the Son Tay raid, Colonel Simons and his men carried 92 radios into the objective area—almost as many as possessed by a standard infantry battalion. They were assessed as being able to communicate nearly 12 times better than the average soldier.[52] During the Mayaguez crisis, the NSC was aware of the Cambodian firing on the Navy P-3 reconnaissance aircraft within 20 minutes of the incident. The Israelis used their second C-135 as an airborne command post near Entebbe to provide a communications link between the ground force commander and their national leaders. The age of satellite communications has thrust us into what General T. R. Milton (USAF Ret.) has described as the era of "His-eye-is-on-the-sparrow" command and control.[53] Key US policymakers have increased their command and control (and communications) in various crisis situations down to

or optional. Non-mandatory events would be reported by exception and
then only if non-occurrence would seriously impair chances of mission
success. It is essential that the political authority, overall mission
commander and tactical assault commanders agree upon those events to be
reported and thoroughly brief all mission personnel of these require-
ments. The "what-if" events and alternate tactical plans would also be
assigned code words and would only be reported if they occurred. Even
over secure channels, a system such as this would provide brevity and
speed in reporting and allow key personnel to follow critical events in
the assault operation.

Command lines during these operations must be streamlined and
relatively simple in order to insure the principle of Unity of Command.
To illustrate this, during Entebbe the command lines ran from the
political-ministerial crisis action team to the Chief of Staff, Israeli
Defense Forces (LTG Mordechai Gur). From there, the military structure
ran from General Gur directly to the Task Force commander, with no
intervening agencies.[54] This type of command and control structure
facilitated political-military interface, increased information flow and
enhanced secrec. During the Iranian crisis the chain of command ran
from President Carter to the Secretary of Defense (Brown), to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Jones), to the Joint Task Force
Commander (MG Vaught). The Holloway Report, however, found that from
COMJTF downward, command channels were "fuzzy" and less well defined in
some areas and only implied in others. Even amongst the planners and
mission forces it was not always readily apparent who was in charge of
what aspect of training and what mission responsibility. Only twelve
days prior to mission execution, and for no apparent reason, a new Deputy
COMJTF was designated partially because he had recent experience in

Iran. The lesson here is that a sound organizational structure is needed, with clear and streamlined command channels that are readily understood by mission personnel. Rigid compartmentalization and OPSEC requirements must not be allowed to interfere with or have an adverse effect on one of the basic Principles of War--Unity of Command.

The importance of both comprehensive mission briefings and full tactical rehearsals cannot be overemphasized. Once again, because of OPSEC requirements we paid the price in preparation for the Iranian rescue attempt. Planners for this operation decided that security requirements overrode the need for a full dress rehearsal involving all of the mission forces. Training exercises were accomplished by individual units at widely separated locations. Though an admittedly much smaller and less complex operation, preparation for the Entebbe raid involved a complete rehearsal by all the Israeli forces on the night preceding the actual operation. Comprehensive, joint mission briefings including at least key personnel from all the units are a planning imperative. These briefings should be conducted as close in time to the actual operation as possible so that last minute intelligence can be disseminated, changes or refinements to plans and procedures can be addressed and critical mission data such as weather and flight conditions evaluated. Coordination and communications should occur continuously throughout the planning cycle, but are especially critical during the final briefing prior to mission execution.

Prior to and during the operation itself there are ways to further facilitate communication other than direct verbal means. Mission briefing and equipment checklists can be devised by planners to ensure that no critical item of equipment is left unchecked or any key mission area

guidance as to what may be discussed and what may not. Following the
Entebbe raid, the hostages were first brought to an Israeli Air Force
base and debriefed and then subsequently flown to Ben Gurion International
Airport to face the media.[56] This type of planning forethought allowed
Israeli mission commanders an opportunity to not only protect sensitive
operational techniques and procedures but permitted an occasion to leak
false stories to the press for deception purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

It is unfortunate that based on historical trends, the prospect for
a decrease in the number of incidents of hostage taking and transnational
terrorism is highly unlikely. Quite the opposite is true. The United
States presently has 282 embassies and diplomatic posts staffed with
almost 14,000 Foreign Service personnel in 144 host countries around the
world.[57] It would not be unreasonable to expect that terrorists will
continue to actively target this population as well as senior military
officers and government officials. Many nations, reeling under the
impact of their own internal terrorist threat, have formed organic
Counter-Terrorist (CT) units to deal with the problem. Many have called
for the formation of an _international_ counter-terrorist agency to deal
with the global aspects of highly organized and state-sponsored trans-
national terrorism. To my knowledge, this organization has yet to be
formed. In the interim, however, national CT units have joined together
to exchange ideas and techniques for combating the problem. (Security
classification restrictions prohibit further discussion on this point.)
Each of the rescue missions discussed in this paper has cried out for
the formation of a US counter-terrorist task force with a viable and

is left open to question. Recognition codes and light signals become important in areas where radio emissions must be kept to a minimum and engine noise or rotor blast may inhibit direct verbal communication. Personnel recognition is especially important during night operations. During the Entebbe raid, Israeli forces wore white hats (similar to US Navy caps) with brims down, enabling the force to quickly identify one another in the dark and the confusion of the assault.[55] The assault force for the Iran attempt wore an American flag on the right shoulder of their assault clothing and covered it with tape for easy removal prior to entry into the embassy compound. This was primarily, however, for benefit of the hostages rather than the assault force. Face-to-face communications between personnel on the ground at Desert One during the retrograde outloading operation became all but impossible due to the darkness, dust and noise of the C-130 engines and helicopter rotor blades. A device such as a neon, color-coded arm band might have aided in recognition of key personnel and should be considered for use by planners for future similar operations. Personal recognition devices would additionally aid in discriminating recovered hostages from assault force personnel during critical personnel accountability procedures conducted under conditions of duress.

Once the operation is completed, it is critical to the success of future operations that lessons learned be captured and recorded as soon as possible. Special operations forces and personnel are as subject to the vagaries of the personnel system as the remainder of the military community and normal personnel rotation and retirement will result in an inevitable corporate memory loss. Of immediate importance following a successful operation is the need to debrief both mission personnel and hostages as to the sensitive details of the operation and provide

41

effective crisis management structure, capable of responding rapidly to terrorist incidents on a global scale. This force would require a multitude of capabilities, a high degree of readiness and training for selectively assigned personnel and the requisite funding and equipment to carry out its mission. Suffice it to say, we have such a force! The days of the ad hoc unit, thrown together to deal with a particular scenario, are over. Yet the basic problems facing the military planner still remain. The planning imperatives briefly touched upon in this paper only scratch the surface of the problems that will have to be overcome. Each scenario will be different and will dictate its own unique set of imperatives. Service parochialism will continue to haunt the most joint of planning efforts as long as competition exists for scarce fiscal resources. The challenge to military planners will be to put aside petty interservice rivalries and take up the gauntlet that has been thrown at our feet by the specter of transnational terrorism. In this author's opinion, with the formation of these national CT organizations we have reached a watershed in the fight against the malignant disease that is terrorism. Like cancer, however, it will be with us for some time to come. The hostage rescue operation is but one stroke of the surgeon's knife. In the words of Theodore Roosevelt, we must never fail to try:

> Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious
> triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than
> to take rank with those poor spirits who neither
> enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the
> grey twilight that knows not victory nor defeat.[58]

ENDNOTES

1. Benjamin F. Schemmer, *The Raid*, p. 200.

2. *Ibid.*, p. ?64.

3. John C. Sawyer, "Son Tay, Success or Failure?" *American Legion*, December 1982, p. 45.

4. William Stevenson, *90 Minutes at Entebbe*, p. 138.

5. Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, *Delta Force*, p. 194.

6. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "22 Months After Desert One, Some on Iran Rescue Try Still Not Decorated," *Armed Forces Journal International*, March 1982, p. 26.

7. Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory and the Rescue Operation," *International Security*, Summer 1981, p. 113.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

9. Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short and Robert C. McFarlane, *Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations*, p. 110.

10. Roy Rowan, *The Four Days of Mayaguez*, p. 142.

11. Stevenson, p. 17.

12. "What the Rescue Reveals," *Commonweal*, 5 May 1980, p. 260.

13. Hamilton Jordan, *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency*, p. 229.

14. Robert D. McFadden, Joseph B. Treaster, Maurice Carroll and Drew Middleton, *No Hiding Place*, p. 215.

15. Rowan, p. 67.

16. Roderick Lenahan, "Handling the Non-War Crisis," *Defense*, December 1982, p. 12.

17. Beckwith and Knox, p. 209.

18. Benjamin F. Schemmer, *The Raid*, p. 12?.

19. Gazit, p. 132.

20. Schemmer, p. 223.

21. David C. Martin, "New Light on the Rescue Mission," Newsweek, 30 June 1980, p. 18.

22. Dr. Stefan D. Possony, "Lessons in Strategic Planning," Defense and Foreign Affairs, June 1980, p. 47.

23. Jordan H., p. 258.

24. Schemmer, p. 237.

25. Stevenson, p. 65.

26. "Tragedy in the Desert—Rescue that Failed," US News and World Report, 5 May 1980, p. 6.

27. Douglas E. Menarchik, "Strike Against Terror," Air University Review, July-August 1980, p. 67.

28. Stevenson, p. 144.

29. Beckwith and Knox, p. 6.

30. Head, Short and McFarlane, p. 106.

31. Schemmer, p. 127.

32. Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought: Part I," Military Review, June 1982, p. 3.

33. Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought: Part II," Military Review, July 1982, p. 25.

34. "A Mission Comes to Grief in Iran," Newsweek, 5 May 1980, p. 28.

35. Beckwith and Knox, p. 264.

36. Stevenson, p. 78.

37. Head, Short and McFarlane, p. 120.

38. Stevenson, pp. 88-89.

39. Schemmer, p. 168.

40. Ibid., p.181.

41. Beckwith and Knox, p. 189.

42. "Debacle in the desert," Time, 5 May 1980, p. 15.

43. "Group Analyzes Reasons for Failure (Part I)," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 15 September 1980, p. 70.

44. Gazit, p. 121.

43. Alexander Scott, "The Lesson of the Iranian Raid for American Military Policy," _Armed Forces Journal International_, June 1980, p. 30.

46. "Operation Jonathan: The Rescue at Entebbe," _Military Review_, July 1982, p. 14.

47. Head, Short and McFarlane, p. 132.

48. "The Failed Mission," _New York Times Magazine_, 30 May 1982, p. 50.

49. Beckwith and Knox, p. 225.

50. "Group Analyzes Reasons for Failure (Part II)," _Aviation Week and Space Technology_, 22 September 1980, p. 144.

51. Stevenson, p. 119.

52. Schemmer, p. 127.

53. T. R. Milton, "Who Has Failed Whom?" _Air Force Magazine_, July 1980, p. 105.

54. Menarchik, p. 74.

55. "Israel Refining Hostage Rescue Tactics," _Aviation Week and Space Technology_, 27 September 1976, p. 17.

56. Gazit, p. 128.

57. A. G. B. Metcalf, "Ordeal in Teheran," _Strategic Review_, Winter 1980, p. 6.

58. McFadden, Treaster, Carroll and Middleton, p. 99.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"'A' for Effort, 'F' for Execution." _Time_. Vol. 115, No. 18,
     5 May 1980, p. 31.

"A Mission Comes to Grief in Iran." _Newsweek_. Vol. 95, No. 18,
     5 May 1980, pp. 24-30, 35, 36.

"Another Rescue Mission." _Newsweek_. Vol. 95, No. 19, 12 May 1980,
     pp. 26-38.

Beckwith, Charlie A., COL, USA (Ret) and Knox, Donald. _Delta Force_.
     New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983.

Bevilacqua, A. C., MAJ, USMC (Ret). "Seven Principles of Soviet Tactical
     Doctrine." _Marine Corps Gazette_. September 1982, pp. 39-43.

Carter, Jimmy. "444 Days of Agony." _Time_. 18 October 1982, pp. 51-63.

Cohen, Samuel T., and Douglass, Joseph D. Jr. "Selective Targeting
     and Soviet Deception." _Armed Forces Journal International_.
     20 September 1983, pp. 7F-11F.

Copley, Gregory. "Strategic Price of the US Iranian Raid." _Defense and
     Foreign Affairs_. Vol. 8, No. 5, May 1980, p. 48.

Daniel, Donald C., and Herbig, Katherine L., eds. _Strategic Military
     Deception_. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.

Day, Samuel H. Jr. "Some Questions About Entebbe." _Bulletin of the Atomic
     Scientists_. Vol. 32, No. 7, September 1976, p. 7.

"Debacle in the Desert." _Time_. Vol 115, No. 18, 5 May 1980, pp. 12-25.

Dudney, Robert S. "Can't Anybody Here Run a War?" _US News and World
     Report_. Vol. 96, No. 8, 27 February 1984, pp. 35-39.

Earl, Robert L., MAJ, USMC. "A Matter of Principle." _United States Naval
     Institute Proceedings_. Vol. 109, February 1983, pp. 29-36.

"The Failed Mission." _New York Times Magazine_. 30 May 1982, p. 50.

Fallows, James. _National Defense_. New York: Random house, 1981.

Foxley-Norris, Air Chief Marshall Sir Christopher. "Entebbe and After."
     Army Quarterly and Defence Journal. Vol. 106, No. 4, October 1976,
     pp. 397-401.

Gazit, Shlomo. "Risk, Glory and the Rescue Operation." _International
     Security_. Vol 6, No. 1, Summer 1981, pp. 111-135.

47

"Group Analyzes Reasons for Failure." <u>Aviation Week and Space Technology.</u>
(3 Part Series) 15, 22 and 29 September 1980, pp. 61-71 (part I);
pp. 140-144 (part II); pp. 84-90 (part III).

Head, Richard G., Short, Frisco W., and McFarlane, Robert C. <u>Crisis
Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean
Confrontations.</u> Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1978.

"Hostage Rescue in London--A Danger Sign." <u>US News and World Report.</u>
Vol. 88, No. 19, 19 May 1980, p. 43.

"The Iran Raid." <u>Gung-Ho.</u> January 1983, pp. 27-30.

"Israel Refining Hostage Rescue Tactics." <u>Aviation Week and Space
Technology.</u> 27 September 1976, p. 17.

"Jack Anderson's Rescue Mission." <u>Newsweek.</u> Vol. 96, No. 9, 1 September
1980, p. 67.

Jacobs, Gene. "The Iran Rescue Mission--An Analysis One Year Later."
<u>Asian Defense Journal.</u> April 1981, pp. 34-41.

"The Jimmy Carter Desert Classic." <u>New Republic.</u> Vol. 182, No. 19,
10 May 1980, pp. 7-9.

Jordan, Amos A., and Taylor, William J. Jr. <u>American National Security--
Policy and Process.</u> Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Jordan, Hamilton. <u>Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency.</u>
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982.

Kissinger, Henry. "Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of May 16."
<u>Department of State Bulletin.</u> Vol. 62, No. 1875, 2 June 1975,
pp. 719-722.

Lapham, Lewis H. "The Somnambulists." <u>Harper's.</u> Vol. 261, No. 1562,
July 1980, pp. 10, 14-16.

Lenahan, Roderick, Colonel, USAF. "Handling the Non-War Crisis." <u>Defense.</u>
December 1982, pp. 9-12.

"The Lessons of Failure." <u>Business Week.</u> No. 2636, 12 May 1980, p. 144.

"Lessons of London's Victory Over Terrorists." <u>US News and World Report.</u>
Vol. 88, No. 19, 19 May 1980, pp. 44-45.

Loosbrock, John F. "Reflections on a Failed Mission." <u>Air Force
Magazine.</u> Vol. 63, No. 6, June 1980, p. 6.

Lowther, William. "Speak Loudly and Carry a Small Stick." <u>Maclean's.</u>
Vol. 93, No. 20, 19 May 1980, pp. 29-30.

Malawer, Stuart S. "Rewarding Terrorism: The US-Iranian Hostage Accords."
<u>International Security Review.</u> Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1981-1982,
pp. 477-496.

Martin, David C. "Inside the Rescue Mission." Newsweek. 12 July 1982, pp. 8-15.

Martin, David C. "New Light on the Rescue Mission." Newsweek. Vol. 95, No. 26, 30 June 1980, pp. 18-20.

McFadden, Robert D., Treaster, Joseph B., Carroll, Maurice, and Middleton, Drew. No Hiding Place. New York: Times Books, 1981.

Menarchik, Douglas E., Captain, USAF. "Strike Against Terror!" Air University Review. Vol. 31, July-August 1980, pp. 65-76.

Metcalf, A. G. B. "Ordeal in Teheran." Strategic Review. Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 1980, pp. 5-8.

Middleton, Drew. "Going the Military Route." New York Times Magazine. 17 May 1981, pp. 103-112.

Milton, T. R., General, USAF (Ret). "Who Has Failed Whom?" Air Force Magazine. Vol. 63, No. 7, July 1980, p. 105.

"Operation Jonathan: "The Rescue at Entebbe." Military Review. Vol. 62, No. 7, July 1982, pp. 2-23.

Possony, Dr. Stefan T. "Lessons in Strategic Planning." Defense and Foreign Affairs. No. 6, June 1980, pp. 46-47.

"The Rescue Attempt." World Press Review. Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1980, p. 14.

"Rescue That Failed: Big Setback for US." US News and World Report. Vol. 88, No. 17, 5 May 1980, pp. 21-23.

Rosenblatt, Roger. "Learning Lessons from an Obsession." Time. Vol. 117, No. 5, 2 February 1981, pp. 53-54.

Ross, Val. "Carter's Waterloo." Maclean's. Vol. 93, No. 18, 5 May 1980, pp. 21-24.

Rowan, Roy. The Four Days of Mayaguez. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975.

Sawyer, John C. "Son Tay, Success or Failure?" American Legion. Vol. 113, No. 6, December 1982, pp. 21, 44-46.

Scali, John. "US Recovers Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy." Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 62, No. 1876, 9 June 1975, pp. 719-722.

Schemmer, Benjamin F. "Presidential Courage and the April 1980 Iranian Rescue Mission." Armed Forces Journal International. Vol. 118, May 1981, pp. 60-62.

Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.

Schemmer, Benjamin F. "22 Months After Desert One, Some on Iran Rescue
     Try Still not Decorated." Armed Forces Journal International.
     Vol. 119, March 1982, pp. 17-18, 26.

Scott, Alexander. "The Lessons of the Iranian Raid for American Military
     Policy." Armed Forces Journal International. Vol. 117, No. 10,
     June 1980, pp. 26, 30-32, 73.

Scranton, William W. "US Gives Views in Security Council Debate on Israeli
     Rescue of Hijacking Victims at Entebbe Airport." Department of State
     Bulletin. Vol. 75, No. 1936, 2 August 1976, pp. 181-186.

Shani, Joshua, Colonel, IAF. Airborne Raids: A Potent Weapon in
     Countering Transnational Terrorism. Research Report. Maxwell AFB:
     Air War College, Air University, February 1983. (No. AU-AWC-83-214)

Sidney, Hugh. "The Essence of Courage." Time. 19 May 1980, p. 26.

Stevens, Jennie A., and Marsh, Henry S. "Surprise and Deception in Soviet
     Military Thought: Part I." Military Review. Vol. 62, No. 6,
     June 1982, pp. 2-11.

Stevens, Jennie A., and Marsh, Henry S. "Surprise and Deception in Soviet
     Military Thought: Part II." Military Review. Vol. 62, No. 7,
     July 1982, pp. 24-35.

Stevenson, William. 90 Minutes at Entebbe. New York: Bantam Books, 1976.

Summers, Harry G., Colonel, USA. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context.
     Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1981.

Summers, Laura. "Consolidating the Cambodian Revolution." Current History.
     Vol. 69, No. 411, December 1975, pp. 218-222.

"Tragedy in the Desert-Rescue that Failed." US News and World Report.
     Vol. 88, No. 17, 5 May 1980, pp. 6-7.

"US Attempts Rescue of American Hostages in Iran." Department of State
     Bulletin. Vol. 80, No. 2039, June 1980, pp. 38-43.

US Department of the Air Force. Air Force Manual 1-1: Functions and
     Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington: 14 February
     1979.

US Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5: Operations. Washington:
     20 August 1982.

"The Vacant Bus Stops of Teheran." Newsweek. Vol. 95, No. 21, 26 May
     1980, p. 47.

"What the Rescue Reveals." Commonweal. Vol. 107, No. 9, 5 May 1980,
     pp. 259-260.

"Why Hostage Rescue Failed: Official Word." US News and World Report.
     Vol. 89, No. 9, 1 September 1980, p. 7.

"Why the Iran Rescue Failed." Time. Vol. 116, No. 9, 1 September 1980, p. 19.

Wolfertz, Robert T., Captain, USMC. "Surviving a Hostage Situation." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 66, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 18-20.